[SANOG] Prefix hijacking, how to prevent and fix currently

[Tarun Dua]

The hijacking has stopped for now.


We are going to pursue this with RIPE to try and get them to delete
the AS number from their whois DB.

Regards
-Tarun

On Fri, Aug 29, 2014 at 10:39 AM, Paul Wilson <pwilson at apnic.net> wrote:
> Tarun, good luck resolving this!
>
> The case also illustrates the need for secure routing through RPKI and secure BGP.
>
> For more info on RPKI, see www.apnic.net/rpki
>
> best,
>
> Paul
>
>
>
>
> On 29 Aug 2014, at 5:19 am, Octavio Alvarez <alvarezp at alvarezp.ods.org> wrote:
>
>> This happens more often than you think. That's why BGP prefix filtering
>> is so important.
>>
>> BGPmon [1] is a good tool to monitor BGP prefixes.
>>
>> [1] http://www.bgpmon.net/
>>
>> On 28/08/14 09:54, Tarun Dua wrote:
>>> AS Number 43239
>>> AS Name SPETSENERGO-AS SpetsEnergo Ltd.
>>>
>>> Has started hijacking our IPv4 prefix, while this prefix was NOT in
>>> production, it worries us that it was this easy for someone to hijack
>>> it.
>>>
>>> http://bgp.he.net/AS43239#_prefixes
>>>
>>> 103.20.212.0/22 <- This belongs to us.
>>>
>>> 103.238.232.0/22 KNS Techno Integrators Pvt. Ltd.
>>> 193.43.33.0/24 hydrocontrol S.C.R.L.
>>> 193.56.146.0/24 TRAPIL - Societe des Transports Petroliers par Pipeline
>>>
>>> Where do we complain to get this fixed.
>>>
>>> -Tarun
>>> AS132420
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> sanog mailing list
>>> sanog at sanog.org
>>> https://lists.sanog.org/mailman/listinfo/sanog
>>>
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