[SANOG] Prefix hijacking, how to prevent and fix currently

[Paul Wilson]

Tarun, good luck resolving this!

The case also illustrates the need for secure routing through RPKI and secure BGP.

For more info on RPKI, see www.apnic.net/rpki

best,

Paul




On 29 Aug 2014, at 5:19 am, Octavio Alvarez <alvarezp at alvarezp.ods.org> wrote:

> This happens more often than you think. That's why BGP prefix filtering
> is so important.
> 
> BGPmon [1] is a good tool to monitor BGP prefixes.
> 
> [1] http://www.bgpmon.net/
> 
> On 28/08/14 09:54, Tarun Dua wrote:
>> AS Number 43239
>> AS Name SPETSENERGO-AS SpetsEnergo Ltd.
>> 
>> Has started hijacking our IPv4 prefix, while this prefix was NOT in
>> production, it worries us that it was this easy for someone to hijack
>> it.
>> 
>> http://bgp.he.net/AS43239#_prefixes
>> 
>> 103.20.212.0/22 <- This belongs to us.
>> 
>> 103.238.232.0/22 KNS Techno Integrators Pvt. Ltd.
>> 193.43.33.0/24 hydrocontrol S.C.R.L.
>> 193.56.146.0/24 TRAPIL - Societe des Transports Petroliers par Pipeline
>> 
>> Where do we complain to get this fixed.
>> 
>> -Tarun
>> AS132420
>> _______________________________________________
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>> sanog at sanog.org
>> https://lists.sanog.org/mailman/listinfo/sanog
>> 
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