[SANOG] Prefix hijacking, how to prevent and fix currently
pwilson at apnic.net
Fri Aug 29 05:09:30 UTC 2014
Tarun, good luck resolving this!
The case also illustrates the need for secure routing through RPKI and secure BGP.
For more info on RPKI, see www.apnic.net/rpki
On 29 Aug 2014, at 5:19 am, Octavio Alvarez <alvarezp at alvarezp.ods.org> wrote:
> This happens more often than you think. That's why BGP prefix filtering
> is so important.
> BGPmon  is a good tool to monitor BGP prefixes.
>  http://www.bgpmon.net/
> On 28/08/14 09:54, Tarun Dua wrote:
>> AS Number 43239
>> AS Name SPETSENERGO-AS SpetsEnergo Ltd.
>> Has started hijacking our IPv4 prefix, while this prefix was NOT in
>> production, it worries us that it was this easy for someone to hijack
>> 22.214.171.124/22 <- This belongs to us.
>> 126.96.36.199/22 KNS Techno Integrators Pvt. Ltd.
>> 188.8.131.52/24 hydrocontrol S.C.R.L.
>> 184.108.40.206/24 TRAPIL - Societe des Transports Petroliers par Pipeline
>> Where do we complain to get this fixed.
>> sanog mailing list
>> sanog at sanog.org
> sanog mailing list
> sanog at sanog.org
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